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Why has the EU been so eager to continue the climate negotiations? Can it be solely attributed to the 
EU feeling morally obliged to be the main initiator of continued progress on the climate change 
negotiations, or can industrial interests in the EU, at least partly, explain the behaviour of the EU? We 
suggest that the individual member countries in the EU, such as Germany and Denmark, have a 
rational economic interest in forcing the technological development of renewable energy sources to 
get a first-mover advantage. Here, the Kyoto Protocol, which imposes binding greenhouse gas 
reductions on 38 OECD countries, implies that, as a first-mover, the EU will potentially sell the 
necessary new renewable technologies, most prominently wind mills, to other countries. In the latest 
EU proposal made in Johannesburg, the EU pushed for setting a target of 15% of all energy to come 
from sources such as windmills, solar panels and waves by 2015. Such a political target level would 
further the EU’s interests globally, and could suggest, in economic terms, why the EU eagerly 
promotes greenhouse gas trade at a global level. In contrast, the US has left the Kyoto agreement to 
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  11: INTRODUCTION 
 
Currently, the EU is actively pursuing the promotion of renewable energy sources which has also 
been seen at the summit in Johannesburg where: “The European Union has been pushing for a 
target of making 15% of energy come from sources such as windmills, solar panels and waves by 
2015. The US is vehemently opposed to those targets, judging them unrealistic, and so are 
petroleum-producing countries” (UN, 2002). 
 
What can explain that the EU so actively promotes renewable energy? Is it due to a sense of being 
morally obliged to act against the threat of global warming, or is the EU trying to capitalise on its 
first mover advantage on renewable energy systems? We want to investigate how different ways of 
implementing of the Kyoto-agreement influence the relative competitiveness of windmills, and how 
this gives the EU incentives to shape policy in order to promote renewable energy sources.  
 
There are several motives for supporting an industry. Porter (1990) argued in favour of protecting 
infant home industry against international competition in the short run. If prices do not represent 
real prices (e.g., due to the generation of negative externalities which are not accounted for) and 
taxation is not feasible, incentives exist to subsidize producers who do not create the negative 
externalities, like renewable energy systems. However, if this type of support yields a company or a 
country a first mover advantage, then incentives exist to exploit such advantages. As Reinhardt 
(1999) argues, managers should make environmental investments for the same reasons they make 
other investments, because they expect them to deliver positive returns or to reduce risks.
1 In the 
same way a country should try to get a positive return on its advantage on renewable systems. 
 
If the renewable energy systems are not competitive internationally without subsidies (or 
alternatively, taxes on the pollution systems) abroad, environmentalists and industrialists (producers 
of renewable energy systems) have an alignment of incentives. Yandle (1983) observed that 
environmentalists and industrialists form “hidden alliances” and this gave rise to his theory of 
“Bootleggers and Baptists” theory, which basically states that industrialists seek to promote a non-
competitive industry, under cover of morally based environmental rhetoric defined and defended by 
                                                           
1 Reinhardt (1999) identifies different approaches that companies can take to integrate the environment into their 
business thinking. Two of them are for companies to manage their competitors by imposing a set of private regulation 
or by helping to shape the rules written by government officials and that companies may be able to make systematic 
changes that will redefine competition in their markets. 
  2“honest” environmentalists. When searching for the motives behind the EU policy on climate 
change, we set out to analyse what incentives the EU have with respect to its green industries within 
renewable energy systems.  
 
Most prominently, the development of the wind energy sector in the EU started after the first oil 
crisis in 1973, where the oil price was multiplied by four. The EU was, in contrast to the US, most 
vulnerable due to its dependence on oil imports from the Middle East. Therefore, by chance, the EU 
gained a first-mover advantage compared to the US within the renewable energy sector because 
energy use was strictly regulated in the EU. Most prominently, both energy taxation of fossil fuels 
and subsidy schemes for renewable energy are at a much higher level in the EU than in the US 
(Svendsen, 2003). In other words, if countries are to reduce greenhouse gases, most exports of green 
technologies will be from the EU. 
 
Whether or not any particular first mover knowledge will turn out to be successful in terms of 
export earnings hinges on numerous factors. Two main factors that we focus on in this paper are the 
evolution of the production costs and changes in the relative prices due to implementation of 
emissions reduction obligations. The evolution of the production costs depends on the shape of the 
learning curve for the relevant technology (see e.g. Junginger et al (2003), and references in the 
article for learning curves for wind farms). The learning curve describes how unit costs of 
production change as the experience in using the technology increases. Ex ante, the exact shape of 
such a curve is uncertain, and a very interesting situation, from an analytical point of view, appears 
when the learning-by-doing cost reduction is not enough to make the technology competitive, 
unless consumers abroad pay the full price for the energy, i.e. a price reflecting both the private and 
the social costs of production (e.g Sims et al (2003) argue that wind based energy will not be 
competitive within a decade). This implies that whether or not the relevant technology can be 
exported to other countries depends on these countries’ emission reduction plans. In this case, the 
country with the first mover knowledge has a strong incentive to convince other countries that they 
also have an obligation to implement policies to reduce CO2 emissions. All this will be analysed by 
use of switch points, which describe how changes in the relative prices of different energy supply 
sources will change the composition of a country’s energy supply sector.  
 
 
  3A general problem in international climate negotiations is the curse of being committed to 
cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma environment. It is only in cases where a country making a 
unilateral move gets an unconditional first mover advantage that the country is able to escape the 
observation in Hoel (1991) that unilateral reductions never increase other countries’ reductions. 
Here countries must try to convince the other countries that they should implement renewable 
energy systems. Could this explain why the EU so eagerly tried to promote their industrial interests 
in Johannesburg by proposing a target of 15% of all energy to come from sources such as 
windmills? On the contrary, unilateral reductions can decrease other countries’ emissions if such 
actions reveal that costs are low. But this is only true if an unconditional first mover advantage 
exists (which could be the case for offshore windmills). By implementing the Kyoto target, a 
country inevitably provides more favourable conditions for wind energy. Our paper shows that 
whether or not this makes wind energy competitive to conventional energy production depends on 
the type of instrument used to make the relevant emissions reductions. If a sufficient number of 
countries agree on a common tradable permit market, and this market is well functioning, then it is 
not likely that changes in relative prices are sufficient to make wind-based energy competitive to 
conventional energy production.  
 
This means that the EU could promote their industry by not supporting unrestricted trade in permits, 
under the presumption that lack of full access to trade will not influence the countries’ willingness 
to accept the original levels of reductions implied by the Kyoto-agreement.
2 However, the 
intensified efforts of the EU to make the Kyoto-agreement unnecessarily expensive in the Hague 
had a serious drawback; it gave the US a perfect opportunity to leave the Kyoto-agreement, see 
Brandt and Svendsen (2002). 
 
Energy markets are dynamic and the existence of a future need for more “sustainable” energy 
sources is hardly doubtable. As the Executive Director of the International Energy Agency (IEA), 
Robert Priddle, puts it: ‘We are not on a sustainable energy path unless we make considerable 
changes.’ (IEA, 2002a). Furthermore, ‘The IEA notes that a projected 57 per cent increase in 
mainly fossil-fuel based energy demand over the next 20 years will exert enormous pressure on the 
global environment. Huge investment demands, continued distortions in energy markets, growing 
                                                           
2 This last point has been questioned in several papers, see e.g. Nentjes and Woerdman (2000), Woerdman (2001) and 
Brandt and Svendsen (2003). See Christensen and Svendsen (1999) concerning the successful US experience on 
tradable permit systems. 
  4problems caused by the insatiable demand for transportation, and barriers to deployment of 
renewable energy technologies, all point to a need for countries to do more’. Here, one of the main 
instruments will be to develop renewable energy further. For example, the German government has 
recently announced an ambitious plan to boost wind power’s share of electricity consumption to ‘at 
least 25 per cent by 2025’. The lion’s share of this will come from a 20–25,000 MW offshore wind 
capacity in the North and Baltic Seas. ‘Within a generation (…) one fourth of our current electricity 
needs will be generated with environmentally-friendly wind power,’ says Environment Minister 
Jürgen Trittin (EWEA, 2002b).  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the theoretical background of first mover 
advantages and switch points. Section 3 reviews the relevant energy price estimates. Section 4 
empirically analyses first movers and country market shares in the wind turbine market. Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
 
 
2: Switch points and first mover advantages  
 
A shift from non-renewable fossil fuels to renewable wind energy will eventually happen because 
fossil fuel reserves are slowly being exhausted. For example, coal producers have to dig deeper 
mines or have to use less efficient coal. Therefore, marginal costs of energy production, based on 
fossil fuels, rise over time. In contrast, wind reserves are inexhaustible within near future. Thus, one 
may assume that within our interval, the marginal costs of wind energy production are constant. At 
a certain point in time, it pays to switch to a renewable resource, for example from coal to wind 
based energy in power plants. State regulation may then speed up this process if environmental 
costs are added to the price of fossil fuels, for example by taxing fossil fuels. Furthermore, a 
renewable energy substitute, such as wind energy, may be subsidised. The new switch point will 
therefore occur earlier on in time.  
 
The switch point approach can also yield valuable insights into how different policy options 
influence the timing of switch points. To illustrate this point, Figure 1 shows a situation where only 
two possible types of energy production exist, coal fired and wind-based. Here we compare two 
policy options, a fully flexible situation, where no restriction on international trade in permits exists, 
and one where only domestic emission reductions are allowed. Coal
NT identifies the price of energy 
  5produced by coal in a non-trade scenario, while Coal
FT is defined as the coal based energy price in a 
full trade situation. Obviously, wind-based energy production becomes competitive compared to 
coal-based energy production at a lower emissions reduction level in a non-trade situation. 
 
 
















First mover advantages in the case we consider relate to technological leadership that materializes 
in export opportunities. Such technological advances can either be the result of deliberate R&D in a 
selected area, or arise as side effects of other types of actions, e.g. political actions. It is possible to 
identify two different types of first mover advantages. The first type results when the gain from the 
achieved technological progress only materializes in exports to countries engaging in serious 
reductions of emissions (such that relative prices in those countries change in favour of the new 
technologies). The second type of first mover advantages exists, when it is possible to develop new 
technologies that are competitive even in situations where countries do not have reduction targets 
for the relevant pollutant. A consequence of this second type is that they in themselves trigger 
reductions in other countries.  
 
How does the appearance of first mover advantages relate to the switch-points? The appearance of 
technological improvements on non-renewable energy sources also changes the switch points, but 
now in all countries that can integrate the new technology into their energy supply sector less 
cheaply than without such technological changes. As discussed in section 4, a number of countries 
have a large potential for wind based energy production. Hence, technological improvements also 
  6accelerate the switch points abroad. Consequently, from the point of view of the country that makes 
the first move, this will make the investment in new technology more likely to be profitable.
3
 
Let a country (or a firm in that country) develop a new technology for reducing emissions. Whether 
or not export opportunities exist for this technology depends on three main factors. Firstly, the 
installation and operation costs of the new technology are competitive compared to existing 
technologies. Secondly, the relative emission reduction from this new technology compared to 
existing technologies also increases the competitiveness of the new technology. Thirdly, the level of 
emissions reduction in the countries that import the new technology is decisive when considering 
the level of reduction and the type of instruments used to achieve the emission targets in question. 
Consequently, the lower the installation and operation costs, the higher the reduction targets and the 
higher the reduction that the new technology enables, the more likely it is that the new technology 
can be exported. 
 
 
3. Will the Kyoto Protocol make wind energy competitive? 
 
Although prices of energy produced by windmills have been falling due to the “learning by doing” 
effect, as discussed in Hansen et al
4 (2003), the simple projection of the trend presented in Figure 2 
shows that the potential for further cost reductions is likely to be small in terms of the estimated 
average windmill price per kW over time.
5 Hence, the most likely reason for wind-energy to be 




                                                           
3 Note, however, that first mover advantages are not likely to be everlasting, since other technologies might also become 
competitive, see, e.g., figure 3. 
4 The technological development following learning-by-doing within the wind turbine industry is impressive: ‘Wind 
turbines have grown dramatically in size and performance during the past 15 years. The early machines of 25 kW with 
10.6-metre rotor diameter can still be found in Denmark, but today the most widely sold turbines have a rated power 
output of 750–1000 kW and a rotor diameter of 48–54 metres. The largest machines commercially available are 2,500 
kW machines with 80-metre rotor diameter placed on 70–80 metre towers. Each 2,500 kW machine produces more 
energy than 200 old 1980 vintage machines. Productivity has thus increased rapidly.’ (Krohn, 2001). The crucial 
parameter is the diameter of the turbine – the longer the blades, the larger the areas swept by the turbine and the greater 
the energy output. Therefore, the trend is towards larger machines. 
5 The technological development has been stimulated both by the process and product innovations as the capacity of the 
individual mill has increased; see Madsen et al (2003). 
  7                                Figure 2: Price per mill DKK/kW, 1980 prices 
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projection of price
 
                                       Source: Hansen et al (2003), table 1, page 4. 
 
 
In order to determine whether or not implementation of the Kyoto-protocol is sufficient to make the 
wind-based energy production competitive, we first need to establish the relevant size of the 
emission tax equal to the marginal cost of reduction (the implicit price of CO2). Next, we need an 
estimate of the marginal costs from using different instruments to implement the Kyoto-protocol. If 
the marginal cost of implementing Kyoto-protocol exceeds the necessary tax, then this indicates that 
wind-based energy will become more competitive.  
 
Concerning the relevant size of the emission tax, Hansen et al (2003) calculate how much the tax on 
CO2 emissions must be in order for the wind-based energy production to be cheaper than coal-based 
production. Table 1 relates the present value of the yearly loss from all energy generated by 
windmills (compared to conventional energy production) to the total savings of CO2 emissions for a 
period of production of 10 and 15 years, respectively. This means that a tax on CO2 per ton ranging 
from 9.2$ (in the 15 years and 3% case) to 29.8$ (in the 10 years and 5% case) will make windmills 
competitive compared to conventional energy production. This result makes it easier to analyse 
when windmills will gain comparative advantages. 
 
 
  8                              Table 1 Implicit price of CO2
        Real interest rate     $ per ton, 1998 prices 
3% 25.5  10 years 
5% 29.8 
3% 9.2  15 years 
5% 12.9 
                                    Reproduced from Hansen et al (2003), table 4, page 16 
 
 
Concerning the marginal costs of implementing the Kyoto-target, Table 2 shows estimates under the 
two policy options used in Figure 1. 
 
 
Table 2: Estimates of marginal costs of implementing the Kyoto-protocol   
a) The marginal costs of meeting the Kyoto target with unlimited access to flexible mechanisms. 
Reported in:  Cost efficient ($ per ton)
a  Domestic implementation ($ per ton)
b
Clinton Administration (1998)  14-23   
Nordhaus and Boyer (1999)  11  125 
Zhang (2000)  9.7   
Nentjes and Woerdman (2000)    250 
Manne and Richels (1998)  70  240 
b) The marginal costs of meeting the Kyoto target when no flexible mechanisms are feasible. 
 
 
Note, that there is a large variation in the estimates presented in Table 2. Thus, the comparison of 
numbers in Tables 1 and 2 should only be thought of as indicative. Keeping this reservation in 
mind, a comparison reveals important information: While it is not assured that windmills will be 
competitive as long as cost efficient measures, in particular a tradable permit system, are 
implemented, windmills receive a large competitive advantage when only domestic implementation 
is allowed.
6 The range of estimates for the marginal reduction costs is 9.7-70$/ton given a cost-
efficient implementation of the Kyoto protocol. In comparison, the range of estimates for the 
necessary tax to make wind-based energy-production competitive is 9.2-29.8$/ton. Because the 
estimates are positioned within the same range of figures, it is not possible to establish whether 
wind-based energy production will become competitive even when implementing the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
                                                           
6 This comparison is only valid given a number of assumptions: reductions are only covered by making coal based 
energy production sufficiently more costly, energy prices are determined by marginal cost prices, and finally, windmills 
are just as effective abroad as in Denmark. 
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Crucially, this result could explain why the EU has been eager to make the costs of meeting the 
targets implied by the Kyoto agreement unnecessarily high by arguing for serious restrictions on 
free trade in CO2-permits (Svendsen, 2003). Free trade, under the best circumstances, could reduce 
marginal reduction costs significantly and keep conventional power plants more competitive than 
renewable energy sources. 
 
The windmill industry provides an example of the two different types of first mover advantages. As 
long as the price of energy remains between the prices of conventional energy supply with and 
without pollution control costs, the first type of first-mover advantage exists. On the other hand, 
when prices for energy from windmills fall below the price of conventional energy supplies, 
regardless of prevailing state of emission reductions, there is an unconditional first-mover gain.
7 
Consequently, the first mover advantages of the first type related to the climate change issue are 
closely connected to the relative price of energy output of different energy producing processes. 
 
However, the costs of producing energy by use of conventional energy systems could also change 
when exposed to greater pressure from competition. In order to get an idea of this, note that energy 
technologies reflect differences in costs and levels of development and can (as done in Grübler et al, 
1999), be placed into three groups. The mature technology has received widespread usage and has 
well known specifications (e.g. combustion gas turbine, gas combined and conventional coal power 
plants). Such technologies can be changed or improved under pressure from competition, but both 
the costs and the general level of energy efficiency are relatively stable. The incremental 
technologies have higher costs and exist in niche markets (e.g., biomass power plants, coal 
combustion cycle power plants, nuclear power plants and wind). They have the potential for higher 
efficiency and potential cost reductions if investment and development continue. The radical 
technologies are, by definition, not widespread but open to radical improvements in performance 
and costs (e.g., geothermal power plants, solar thermal power plants and PV-solar).
8  
 
This is important, since environmental targets change relative prices, and then also create incentives 
to make existing technologies more (energy) efficient. As seen from Figure 3, since the 
                                                           
7 Another example is the Montreal protocol, as discussed in section 3. 
8 See Grübler et al (1999) for a very detailed discussion of the dynamics of energy technologies and a more thorough 
description of the different phases in the development of new technologies.   
  10conventional energy-producing sector can be placed into the mature sector, costs of production will 
probably not change significantly as competition increases. 
 
 
Figure 3 Position of technologies on the learning curve
9
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The conclusion so far is that within the range of estimates presented in this paper, whether or not 
the implementation of the Kyoto-protocol makes wind energy competitive depends on which 
instruments are used to achieve the Kyoto targets. If the Kyoto targets are met without the use of 
flexible mechanisms, then wind energy will be competitive compared to coal-based energy 
production. On the other hand, if the full use of flexible mechanisms is allowed, then it is 
ambiguous whether or not wind energy will be competitive. Figure 3 also reveals that new and 
radical technologies also have the potential to be more competitive, if the price of conventional 
energy production increases. In light of this, the EU proposal in Johannesburg has been pushing for 
a target of 15% of energy to come from sources such as windmills, solar panels and waves by 2015 





                                                           
9 Mature technologies in widespread use have lower costs with lower variance; the costs of radical new technologies are 
higher and more variable. Variability of costs is also an indicator of the uncertainty of technology costs. Radical 
technologies are not much tried. 
  114: First movers and country market shares 
 
The rapid development of the wind turbine industry is caused by the subsidisation of wind energy 
since the first oil crisis in 1973. This story seems to fit the ideas of Porter (1990) who argues that it 
may pay a country to subsidise its industries for a period. Building up a strong home market will 
clear the road for exports and a profitable industry in the longer run. As argued by Madsen et al. 
(2003), the early subsidies for alternative energy sources from the Danish government created a big 
home market for wind turbines, and gave the Danish producers first mover advantages in the world 
market. However, an important condition for a successful outcome of such first mover advantages is 
the existence of learning-by-doing and technological development within the industry, which could 
further reduce the production costs and consolidate the competitive advantages of the industry 
(ibid.). 
 
The most important subsidy has been a price guarantee per produced kWh (kilowatt-hour): 
‘Without these subsidies, windmills as suppliers of electricity would not have been competitive 
compared to traditional power plants and hence the producers of windmills would not have got a 
foothold in the Danish industry. This is also illustrated by the development in demand where a large 
part of the wind turbines produced in the pioneering years in the 1980s were sold domestically 
whereas exports made up a substantial part of sales in the 1990s.’ (Madsen et al, 2003, p. 1). In 
Denmark, 15 per cent of all electricity in 2000 was from wind energy (BTM Consult, 2001). 
 
Madsen et al (2003) describe the formidable market development within the wind turbine industry. 
They note that since the 1980s, Danish (and German) wind turbine producers in particular have 
gained a leading position in this new industry. In 1999, Danish wind turbine producers had a market 
share of half the world market with a turnover of some $1.5 billion out of a total market of $3 
billion, and in 1994–1999 the wind industry grew at a rate of some 40 per cent per annum, and 
growth rates of around 20 per cent per year are foreseen for the first decade of the new millennium.  
 
Overall, the historical reasons for subsidising the wind turbine industry are strong environmental 
concerns in Denmark, but they also seem to confirm the idea of achieving an economic net gain for 
the country: ‘A majority in the Danish Parliament consisting of the ‘Left Wing Socialists’ and the 
centre parties supported the development of wind power. Otherwise it could not have been done. In 
  12addition to their interest in the environment, they realised that there was a potential for job creation 
and export possibilities that would bring foreign exchange to the country.’ (Tranæs, 2001a; 2001b). 
Today, the wind turbine industry accounts for 12,000 jobs in Denmark while component supplies 
and installation of Danish turbines currently create another 6,000 jobs worldwide. Wind energy 
employs some 40,000 people worldwide, and 30,000 in the EU (Krohn, 2001). 
 
Concerning market size, Germany, Spain and the US were the three largest markets in 2001 on an 
accumulated basis. The markets of the US, India and China are still relatively small compared to 
Germany and Denmark, for example. Russia, which also has a huge potential, is not even within the 
top ten. Total installed mega watts (MW) have almost been doubled in size from 1998 to 2000 
(BTM Consult, 2001). 
 
From figure 4 it is clear that EU wind turbine producers dominate the product market rather than 
US producers. Each nation’s share of the market in 2000 amounts to 51 per cent for Denmark, 18 
per cent for Spain, 16 per cent for Germany and 15 per cent for the rest. Many producers in the 
‘Others’ group will be located in the EU too. Thus, the market is clearly dominated by EU wind 
turbine producers who have more than a 85 per cent market share.  
 
 








Denmark Spain Germany US India japan Others
 
                Note: Export is defined as the sales by the nation where the headquarters are situated. 
                Source: BTM Consult (2001, p. 13).  
 
 
  13Note furthermore, that wind turbine producers operate world-wide, typically exporting about three 
quarters of their total production. The biggest wind turbine producer, Danish Vestas, for example, 
had a 83.4 per cent average export share for 3 years (1998–2000), ibid. 
 
So far, wind markets have primarily been driven by environmental concerns and political reasons in 
Western Europe. However, with respect to future market development, a number of huge potential 
markets exist for profitable wind energy production. In particular, Canada and Mexico (non-Annex 
B countries) have favourable land and wind conditions. China has heavy pollution problems along 
its east coast due to the extensive use of fossil fuels that create local pollution, such as oxides of 
sulphur and nitrogen (which are a cause of acid rain). Therefore, China, in need of clean wind 
energy, is also a huge potential market, with its enormous potential of wind resources along the 
coastal area, on the offshore islands and Inner Mongolia. Similarly, the wind market potential of 
Russia with its vast areas and excellent wind conditions is unique. Furthermore, the learning curve 
in Figure 3 might underestimate the potential of wind energy. The reason is that offshore wind 
power is expected by some to be the big thing in the future.  
 
In Madsen et al (2003) the relationship between size of a windmill and the costs/kW is estimated 
and it is clearly negative. Off-shore wind turbines are expected to reach the size of 5 MW in the 
beginning of the next decade, which will reduce costs of wind-based energy production 
considerably (EWEA, 2002c). Thus, if offshore-based energy production turns out to reduce 
production costs more than estimated in Figure 3, then the likelihood that windmills become 
competitive, even if a cost effective approach is chosen to implement the Kyoto targets, is 
increased. According to Eddie O’Connor, Vice President of the European Wind Energy 
Association: ‘The development of major offshore wind energy parks will be the biggest energy 






Overall, we suggested that EU climate policy could be explained by the potential first mover 
advantages. Individual member states such as Germany and Denmark have large potential first 
mover advantages if other countries face demanding greenhouse gas reduction obligations as well. 
  14These first mover advantages and large country market shares stem from knowledge in renewable 
energy technology. Promoting green industries in the EU could explain, in economic terms, why the 
EU eagerly promotes greenhouse gas trade at a global level whereas the US has left the Kyoto 
agreement to save the import costs of buying the EU’s renewable systems. We noted, how the wind 
energy market, for example, is booming at the moment having a strong export orientation. 
 
As argued, the reason for the development of the EU wind turbine industry is that wind energy has 
been subsidised following the first oil crisis in 1973. The most important subsidy has been a price 
guarantee per produced kWh (kilowatt-hour), which enabled the windmill industry to gain a strong 
foothold in Germany and Denmark, for example. Without subsidies, our analysis shows that 
implementing the Kyoto-targets is not necessarily enough to make wind-based energy systems 
competitive under free market conditions. As seen from our analysis, the potential for much larger 
exports can only be realised when the Kyoto-targets are implemented successfully and, in 
particular, if they are not implemented in a cost-efficient way. This suggests that the EU proposed 
restrictions on trade in permits after the Kyoto agreement at The Hague in 2000 to promote the 
‘green’ EU export industries. 
 
In perspective, one may discuss whether it could pay a country to subsidise its industries for a 
period. Building up a strong home market for infant industries may clear the road for exports and a 
profitable industry in the longer run. Normally, it is not possible for a government to pick the right 
winners in advance – this is a market task. Rather, the best way for a government to promote 
technological progress is to get the prices right. By internalising all external costs of production, the 
right prices will emerge, sending the right signals to the markets, resulting in necessary structural 
changes that reflect our knowledge about the state of the environment. Thus, one may argue that the 
subsidy of the wind turbine industry in both Germany, Denmark and Spain indeed seems to have 
been a ‘lucky punch’ because the external cost of the greenhouse effect has eventually materialised 
itself in international agreements to fight it. 
 
The future looks bright for self-supply energy systems and the everlasting resource of wind power 
for three main reasons. First, the fact that ratification and implementation of the Kyoto Protocol 
seems most likely in the absence of the United States. Both China and India have lately shown 
much interest in participating and reaping the gains from trade. Second, the fact that wind energy is 
  15now becoming competitive, with fossil based energy at prices around 4 $cents per kWh and with 
offshore parks as a new and promising technological option. What is more, the cost of wind energy 
is falling, whilst other fossil fuel energy technologies are becoming more expensive as they are 
exhausted. Third, the fact that international demand for energy diversity has increased. This is to 
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